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Human beings enjoy a wide range of mental capacities: we learn,
remember, and think. And we have these capacities largely in virtue of the
brain. But how does the brain work? Carl Craver’s Explaining the Brain
provides a careful, detailed examination of the explanatory framework
employed in contemporary neuroscience and how this framework revolves
around the notion of a mechanism. Moreover, he argues that an adequate
appreciation of this framework requires reconsidering a number of issues
in the philosophy of science.
Explaining the Brain can be understood in terms of the intersection
of two recent trends in the philosophy of science. The first is
methodological: the central task for the philosopher of science is
descriptive, not prescriptive. Thus Craver writes that a philosophical
account of explanation in neuroscience “should deal correct verdicts
on. . . clear and uncontroversial examples unless there is a compelling
reason to suspect that the judgments of science are wrong,” which allows
him to dispense with several well-known accounts of explanation (p.
ix). For instance, Craver argues that the deductive-nomological (D-N)
model of explanation under which explanation involves the subsumption
of the explanandum event under a law of nature is inappropriate
for neuroscience, essentially because neuroscientific explanations often
involve an explanandum (for instance, the release of neurotransmitters)
that doesn’t typically follow the kind of events cited in the explanatory
premises (for instance, action potentials). Thus he concludes that since “in
neuroscience improbable things happen, and when they do, mechanisms
can explain them,” such explanation cannot be captured by the D-N Model
(p. 40).
The second trend is the emphasis on the notion of a mechanism,
particularly in the philosophy of biology and the philosophy of
∗Received June 2009. Accepted August 2009.
†Kevin Morris is currently a Ph.D student in the philosophy department at Brown
University. He works primarily in metaphysics and philosophy of mind, but is also
interested in philosophy of science, epistemology, and topics in the history of philosophy.
Spontaneous Generations 3:1 (2009) ISSN 1913-0465. University of Toronto.
Copyright 2009 by the HAPSAT Society. Some rights reserved. 239
Morris REVIEW: Craver, Explaining the Brain
psychophysical sciences. Craver characterizes a mechanism as a “set of
entities and activities organized such that they exhibit the phenomenon
to be explained” (p. 5). His central claim is that neuroscience is
in the business of discovering mechanisms–discovering how brain
functions result from the components of the brain–and that neuroscientific
explanations are thus mechanistic explanations, explanations that
describe mechanisms. Explaining the Brain provides the most substantive
and rigorously worked-out account of the mechanistic approach to date:
Craver utilizes a “manipulationist” account of causation to spell out the
sense in which mechanisms are constituted by entities and activities that
exhibit, or produce, the phenomenon targeted for explanation (Chapter
3) and provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between the
mechanistic approach and reductionism (Chapter 4), the conception
of reality as consisting of different “levels” (Chapter 5), the possibility
of non-fundamental explanation (Chapter 6), and the unity of science
(Chapter 7).
Despite the many virtues of Explaining the Brain, Craver’s assessment
of the status of the mechanistic outlook vis-à-vis reductionism is
somewhat unsatisfying. Here he argues that despite its reductionist
associations, the mechanistic approach in fact possesses a number
of nonreductive credentials. But, first, there is an important tension
between Craver’s methodological outlook and an adequately formulated
reductionist position; second, Craver often seems to equate reduction with
intertheoretical “bridge law” reduction, which is problematic if alternative
conceptions of reduction and reductionism are available. I’ll consider these
worries in turn.
Concerning the first worry, Craver argues that mechanistic explanations
in neuroscience are often “multi-level” in the sense that they may “refer
to the behavior of organisms, the processing functions of brain systems,
the representational and computational properties of brain regions, the
electrophysiological properties of nerve cells, and the structures and
conformation changes of molecules” (p. 9). Craver takes this to imply
the failure of “radical fundamentalism”–“the claim that the only real
explanations are to be found at some fundamental level” (p. 12). More
generally, an explanation that is “multi-level” is “nonreductive” in the
sense that it doesn’t appeal exclusively to a privileged “lowest” or “most
fundamental” level.
This shows that there is a sense in which explanations in neuroscience
are not always “reductive,” and thus that there is a sense in which
neuroscience is not reductive. But what follows from this? After all, when
it comes to explanation, it is plausible that a reductionist should only insist
on the in-principle explainability of the target phenomenon in lower-level
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terms. And so if we have reason to believe that such an explanation is
possible, we can maintain that the phenomenon is reductively explainable.
It is compatible with some phenomenon being reductively explainable in
this sense that extant explanations of that phenomenon may not qualify as
strictly reductive and that working scientists may often not be interested
in advancing reductive explanations. What Craver additionally needs to
provide, then, is a reason for thinking that the “multi-level” explanations in
neuroscience are the best that we could in principle advance with respect
to the relevant phenomena.
Similarly, Craver often emphasizes that insofar as mechanistic
explanation involves explaining some behavior or capacity of a
macrosystem, the initial task is to adequately characterize the behavior
or capacity that needs to be explained, which often requires considerable
higher-level research (pp. 125-127). This gets us a nonreductive picture if
we think that a reductionist is committed to the irrelevance of research into
macrosystems independently of their micro-constituents.
But it is far from clear that a reductionist–say, someone committed to
the in-principle explainability of macro-phenomena in micro-terms–must
deny the importance of higher-level research, particularly given
the epistemic limitations and often pragmatic motivations of human
researchers. And while a mechanistic explanation will include the behavior
of the macrosystem targeted for explanation, it is crucial to note that its
role in the explanation is to serve as the explanandum: in a mechanistic
explanation, we aim to explain the behavior of the system.
Concerning the second worry, Craver contrasts the mechanistic
approach to “constitutive” explanation, explanation of the behavior of a
system in terms of the parts of the system, with what he calls the “reductive
approach.” On the latter account, constitutive explanation is a form of
D-N explanation: the behavior of a macrosystem is explained by positing
“bridge laws” between the theory utilized to characterize the system and
the theory utilized to characterize the components of the system, which
allows us to derive the laws that characterize the macrosystem from those
that characterize the components. In contrast, the mechanistic approach
“construes [constitutive] explanation as a matter of decomposing systems
in their parts and showing how those parts are organized together in such
a way as to exhibit the explanandum phenomenon” (p. 109).
If “reductive explanation” is the deduction of one theory from another
via “bridge laws” and mechanistic explanation doesn’t work this way, then
there is a sense in which mechanistic explanations aren’t “reductive.”
But, for instance, we might just think of reductive explanation as the
explanation of some phenomenon in more basic or lower-level terms; so,
for instance, an explanation of some mental phenomenon is reductive
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so long as it doesn’t appeal to any distinctively mental properties in the
explanatory premises. More generally, the worry is that many philosophers
of a more reductionist temperament (for instance, Jaegwon Kim, David
Lewis, and Andrew Melnyk) have discarded the bridge law model and
provided alternative formulations of reductionist theses concerning both
ontological and explanatory issues.
While the considerations advanced in Explaining the Brain thus
don’t seem to get us a substantive nonreductive understanding of
the mechanistic approach, this doesn’t impugn Craver’s many careful
discussions of explanation and theorizing in neuroscience. Moreover,
Craver provides a number of insightful discussions of key issues and
concepts in the philosophy of science, including the notion of a “level”
and the unity of science. Explaining the Brain succeeds in advancing our
understanding of the mechanistic outlook, both in neuroscience and more
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